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As recent scholarship has affirmed, the most salient characteristic of 
American sentimental writing is not so much excessive feeling but inteipersonal 
experience, the showcasing of "the self-in-relation."1 Nineteenth-century 
sentimental novels highlight affective connections. They expose the crucial role 
that emotional attachments play in the development of the self, and they function 
as pedagogical tools, teaching their readers how to interact and establish 
community with others. Of course, these sentimental novels were only one means 
of representing interrelational experience. Nineteenth-century fiction offered 
scenes of hypnosis, magnetism, mesmerism, and romantic love as alternative 
ways for figuring the self in relation to others. What differentiates sentimentalism 
from these other phenomena is the former's commitment to the fantasy of 
similitude. Sentimental writing features interactions among participants who 
are manifestly diverse but whose differences belie a common humanity and 
capacity for affect. While mesmerism and hypnosis foreground the coercive 
nature of their projects (the power of one subject over another), sentimentalism 
offers up, at least at first glance, a vision of affinity and sameness. For the 
sentimentalist, all men are created equal not because they are endowed with 
certain inalienable rights, but because all have the same ability to grieve and to 
love intensely. Moreover, through the device of sympathy, each subject has the 
capacity to enter into the sentiments of another, to feel the pain or pleasure of 
his neighbor and thus to achieve a degree of shared affective experience. 
Sentimentalism, then, imagines a democratic world based in the communitarian 
values of common feeling, collective action, and public responsibility. 
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And yet, even as sentimental literature stresses attunement of feeling and 
common capacity for affect, it is grounded in a framework of social inequity. 
Sympathetic connections take place at sites of disparity—at moments that expose 
the relative gain or (more likely) loss of one person in relation to another. "1 
love you," Little Eva tells the slave girl Topsy in Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852) 
"because you haven't had any father, or mother, or friends;—because you've 
been a poor abused child."2 It is precisely Topsy's deprivation (her poverty, her 
suffering, her want of familial connections) that makes possible an emotional 
correspondence between the two girls. Their affective attunement, in other words, 
is contingent on the asymmetry of their lived conditions. Sentimentalism, then, 
can imagine alignment of hearts only when it imagines disparity in circumstance. 
Social or external inequities are the conditions for internal correspondence of 
feeling, and thus in this fiction, collectivity is achieved only in the context of 
abuse. This is what I call the paradox of sentimentalism. 
That antebellum writers would avail themselves of a discourse that 
simultaneously affirms emotional affinity and social disparity is perhaps not 
surprising. After all, the Northeastern American middle class that both produced 
and consumed sentimental fiction was itself intensely conflicted. Emerging out 
of urban-industrial growth and the implementation of a wage-labor system, this 
class of merchants, manufacturers, bankers, professional clerks, and shopkeepers 
was committed to an ethic of acquisition and upkeep. Fully conscious of the 
liminality of their positions (fortunes rose and fell in these years with dramatic 
unpredictability), members of this American bourgeoisie were zealously 
protective of their newly acquired status, policing their neighborhoods, churches 
and parlors for signs of encroachment by working-class and non-white subjects.3 
At the same time that this growing white middle class contributed to an 
increasingly hierarchized society, however, portions of it were also outraged by 
the unequal treatment of slaves, free blacks, Indians, immigrants, and (to a lesser 
extent) women. Having achieved its status in large part through Jacksonian 
progress and entrepreneurial initiative, this emerging middle class was eager to 
protect the procedures of democratic mobility. Those agitating on behalf of the 
dispossessed borrowed the rhetoric of the revolutionary and republican period, 
insisting that America would fulfill its democratic ideals only when it granted 
full representation and equality before the law to its disfranchised populations. 
The antebellum urban middle class was thus characterized by two essentially 
different ideological agendas: a largely socio-economic program oriented towards 
authority and distinction and a largely political program geared towards parity 
and union.4 Given this internal rift, the production and popularity of 
sentimentalism during the antebellum years appears entirely logical. In a period 
characterized by conflicting tendencies towards differentiation and unity—when 
an emerging white middle class struggled to distinguish itself and protect its 
privileged status at the same moment that abolitionists and reformers mobilized 
increasingly radical egalitarian rhetoric—the development of an ideological 
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practice that could negotiate between social hierarchy and democratic idealism 
proved crucial. Sentimentalism provided such a practice. Insofar as it imagined 
interior similitude in the context of external or social disparity, it allowed middle-
class readers to imagine self-other relations simultaneously in terms of 
commonality and distinction. ït was thus a useful discourse with which to mediate 
between conflicting impulses towards political egalitarianism on the one hand 
and socio-economic hierarchy on the other. 
In this way, we might understand sentimentalism as what Raymond Williams 
has called a "dominant practice"—an expression of the interests of a ruling 
class, that appears natural and justified (despite its subordinating effects) and is 
thus able to elicit consent.5 According to this logic, sentimentalism was a way 
for the American bourgeoisie to consolidate and obscure its power. By embracing 
the rhetoric of equality, in other words, sentimentalism worked to assuage social 
conflict while stabilizing categories of difference. Such an understanding helps 
to explain the whiff of hypocrisy and disingenuousness in this literature—the 
way loving exchanges appear haunted by an undercurrent of malevolence. At 
the same time, however, it would be inaccurate to dismiss sentimentalism as 
merely a tool of middle-class domination. As Raymond Williams reminds us, 
hegemonies are always incomplete because "no mode of production and therefore 
. . . no dominant culture ever in reality includes or exhausts all human practice, 
human energy, and human intention."6 Sentimentalism was not a totalizing, 
internally rigorous system but rather a fluid and contested method for presenting 
human relationships. That it arose out of a genuine commitment to contradictory 
ideals meant that sympathetic exchanges in this literature could be fluid and 
unpredictable— marked by changing dynamics of affinity and struggle. 
This understanding of sentimentalism was mockingly elaborated by Herman 
Melville in his 1857 novel, The Confidence-Man. Set aboard a steamer satirically 
named the Fidèle, The Confidence-Man follows the machinations of a wily 
mountebank and highlights the scene of sympathetic exchange as a site where 
social interactions continually upend themselves. In one particularly fascinating 
tableau, Melville traces the relations between benefactor and beneficiary as they 
slowly metamorphose over the course of an encounter. At the start of this scene, 
a bereaved character referred to as the Weedman appeals to an affluent Merchant 
for both sympathy and bank notes. When the latter responds with suspicion 
rather than generosity, the Weedman takes on an air of "mild gravity, not a little 
disconcerting" Melville states "as there was in it what seemed the aspect not 
alone of the superior, but, as it were, the rebuker." As the offended Weedman 
departs, the wealthy Merchant is left feeling embarrassed and "not wholly without 
self-reproach."7 In the course of their interaction, then, the beneficiary is 
transformed from importuner to moralizer, the benefactor from philanthropist 
to penitent. Melville's portrait demonstrates the elasticity of sympathetic 
transactions and thus the inadequacy of understanding sentimentalism in terms 
of a static model of benevolence and gratitude or domination and submission. 
8 Gillian Silverman 
Through its parodying of the sentimental scene of exchange, The Confidence-
Man makes manifest what much of senti mental ism tacitly acknowledges: that 
affective connections are fragile and shifting, that they contain areas of 
undecidability, moments of rupture wherein relations can rearrange and transpose 
themselves. In this way, many sentimental authors never fully manage the middle-
class hegemonizing effects of their novels. Rather, in providing (whether 
consciously or not) scenes of protean and amorphous relations—scenes which 
are, moreover, subject to the varied reactions of individual readers—these authors 
create spaces in which social interactions are never fully determined. Recognizing 
sentimental novels through this fluid, upending framework is crucial to 
understanding their resistance to narrow partisan readings. In the last thirty years 
criticism on sentimental fiction has tended to emphasize either its democratic 
potential or its coercive power, viewing sentimentalism alternatively as "the 
political strategy of the disenfranchised"8 or as an "imperial project... intended 
as a tool for the control of others."9 More recently, Lora Romero, Eve Sedgwick, 
and Cathy Davidson (among others) have called attention to the inadequacy of 
understanding antebellum sentimental and domestic fiction through binaries of 
freedom and subjection and subversion and complicity.10 
My reading extends this latter scholarship insofar as it, too, resists reducing 
the complexity of sentimental literature to a single political platform or unitary 
design. More specifically, it insists that many sentimental novels contained 
changing dynamics and unpredictable exchanges, that reflect the conflicted 
ideological impulses of their authors. In what follows, 1 examine both the 
egalitarian and the hierarchizing strains of antebellum sentimental fiction. 
Through tracing the concept of sympathy, first in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral 
Sentiments and then in the fiction of Catharine Maria Sedgwick, Harriet Beecher 
Stowe, and E.D.E.N. Southworth, I argue that while some sentimental writers 
merely showcased sympathetic relations in an effort to legitimate social hierarchy, 
for others, the results were less fully determined. This latter group presented 
sympathetic exchanges as fluid and changing, characterized by alternating 
patterns of aggressive willfulness and intimate dependence—now culminating 
in merging, now in repudiation, now in domination, now in love. These variations 
in relational dynamics bear a striking resemblance to what psychoanalytic thinker 
Jessica Benjamin (following Habermas) has called intersubjectivity. According 
to Benjamin, the intersubjective perspective focuses on the space of interaction 
between individuals and argues for a mutual dynamism in which the self is capable 
of both "transforming and being transformed by the other."111 Using Benjamin's 
theory of intersubjectivity, I demonstrate that while displays of sympathy were 
organized around power differentials, these could shift and transform as authors 
sought to represent characters in dynamic relation to others. The concern of 
these authors was to present a flexible model of interaction, one able to 
accommodate fluctuations in feeling and ascendancy and thus to reflect the 
volatility and unpredictability of antebellum social relations. 
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Correspondence and Community 
Writing in Britain at the end of the eighteenth century, Hannah More was 
one of the earliest women to investigate the category of sentiment, or what was 
then more commonly referred to as "sensibility" She characterized it as "that 
exquisite sense of feeling which God implanted in the heart as a stimulus to 
quicken us in relieving the miseries of others."12 According to More, displays of 
sensibility needed to follow two sets of guidelines. First, they had to be 
"conscientiously governed" (177). Unregulated feeling, she wrote, stood at the 
root of "some of the blackest crimes which stain the annals of mankind, 
profligacy, murder, and especially suicide" (177). Second, and just as crucially, 
passion needed to find its proper direction. It should never be turned inward on 
the self, she insisted, but rather should "flow out in active charity, and afford 
assistance, protection, or consolation to every species of distress within its reach" 
( 187). The purpose of sensibility, then, is two-fold for More: "it is bestowed for 
an exercise to the possessors own virtue, and at the same time as a keen 
instrument with which he may better work for the good of others" (177). In 
other words, it elicits and reinforces self-control while simultaneously creating 
benevolence and community. 
For the generation of American sentimental writers who succeeded and 
read Hannah More, her teachings were indispensable.13 Primarily middle-class 
white women, they borrowed More's understanding of sensibility as both self-
regulatory and other-directed. While they stressed the importance of individual 
discipline, therefore, they tended to reject the solitary, self-reliant subject in 
favor of an interpersonal or relational orientation. In their novels, characters do 
not struggle alone but rather achieve self-command and definition through the 
efforts of those around them. The loving friend, the stern older brother, the 
concerned minister—these are the familiar figures who ensure the proper growth 
and formation of the protagonist. Accordingly, isolation and lack of fellow-
feeling constitute the greatest threats to a self who can only arrive at a reflexive 
understanding through sustained contact with another. When, in Uncle Tom s 
Cabin, Senator Bird finally concedes that his wife knows him better than he 
knows himself (153), he is merely reinforcing the sentimental lesson that 
relational ties form the best means towards self-actualization. 
Sentimental ism's attention to self-realization, it needs to be stressed, does 
not mean that it is merely a variant of individualism. While recent 
deconstructionist accounts have collapsed the difference between sentimentalism 
and individualism—seeing them as fungible and mutually constituting 
phenomena14—it is important to retain the distinction between the two, not least 
because it was precisely this difference between sentimental notions of 
community and individualist notions of autonomous self-hood that preoccupied 
many non-sentimental writers of the antebellum period. Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
for example, was primarily committed to an understanding of the self in isolation 
from the influence or understanding of others. "[Sjouls never touch their objects," 
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he wrote in "Experience" ( Î 844). "An innavigable sea washes with silent waves 
between us and the things we aim at and converse with."15 Prompted by the 
death of his son and his own failure, as father, to grieve deeply in response to 
this loss, Emerson's essay is a meditation on the finality of individual perception 
and the impossibility of mutual or shared experience: "Life will be imaged, but 
cannot be divided nor doubled. . . . The soul is not twin-born, but the only 
begotten . . . admitting no co-life."16 
While sentimental writers acknowledged the specificity of individual 
response, they did not, like Emerson, see this as resulting in disconnection. 
Indeed, the great irony of senti mental ism is that it understands individual feeling 
as the basis for shared experience; that is, it relies on the particular in creating a 
vision of the universal.17 This movement towards shared experience is principally 
achieved through the mechanism of sympathy. Comparable to our contemporary 
understanding of empathy, sympathy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
referred to the ability to experience the feelings of someone else. As Adam 
Smith explains in his influential Theory of Moral Sentiments ( 1759), in sympathy 
we use our imagination to "place ourselves in [another's] situation, we conceive 
ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and 
become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea 
of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is 
not altogether unlike them."18 Such place switching, Smith elaborates, can 
actually ameliorate the pain of sufferers who "disburthen themselves of a part 
of their distress" the moment they share it with a sympathizing witness (15). 
According to this fantasy, emotional experiences of joy and affliction need not 
be restricted to discrete individual subjects but can permeate the perimeters of 
neighboring bodies creating a mutuality of affect that Smith calls 
"correspondence."19 
Such affective sharing points to a particular understanding of psychosomatic 
experience in the eighteenth century—a perception that individual feeling is 
fluid and unboundaried, capable of being accessed by multiple others. But it 
also has crucial political implications. Insofar as sympathy creates an atmosphere 
of shared experience, it obliterates the distance and distinction between subjects, 
rendering people (in Smith's words) "in some measure the same" (9). Moreover, 
to the extent that sympathetic responsiveness is said to characterize all individuals 
(according to Smith, even "the greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of 
the laws of society, is not altogether without it" [9]), it is imagined as the common 
denominator of social life. What conjoins humanity, then, is not merely 
correspondence of feeling but corresponding capacity for feeling. "[Y]ou seem 
to feel just as 1 do . . . " a working-class woman remarks to her affluent mistress 
in Catharine Maria Sedgwick's A New-England Tale (1822). "[N]ot that I mean 
to compare myself to you," she continues, "but it is the nature of the feeling— 
it is the same in the high and the low, the rich and the poor."20 There is, 
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sentimentalism tells us, a minimal affective sameness among subjects, and this 
is what makes for equality and community. 
Problems arise, however, when this minimal affective sameness acquires 
heft and definition, when its universal quality begins to be associated with its 
particular and provincial manifestations. Naomi Schor has written about this 
false quality of universalism and the difficulty it poses for an emancipatory 
politics: 
[W]hat has passed for the universal . . . is in fact nothing but 
a sham, a fake, a phony, or, in Rosi Braidotti's feminist 
rendition, 'an inflation of masculinity into cosmic 
transcendental narcissism.'... The false universal passes itself 
off as a whole (Mankind) standing for all its constitutive parts 
(Women, Children, Blacks, Queers), rather than recognizing 
that it is a mere fragment of the whole, which is to say, 
man. . . . The universal whose cover we have blown is, then, 
an inflated particular.21 
Translating Schor's statement into the terms of sentimentalism, we might say 
that in mobilizing the rhetoric of universalism ("we're all alike inside"). 
sentimentalism masks its investment in particulars. When sentimental writers 
affirm (as they often do) that God loves all his children regardless of status or 
skin color, they obscure that their very designation of God is based on a paradigm 
of white, middle-class Christian particularity. Thus, to return to Sedgwick, the 
same author who imagines virtue to be "the same in the high and the low, the 
rich and the poor" also imagines it as unmistakably white. "Look in the glass," 
says one character to a virtuous slave who has been accidentally coated in lint 
from a nearby dustbin, "you'll see how white you'll be in heaven; the black 
stains will all be washed out there."22 Sedgwick reminds us that while faith in 
social similitude could participate in visions of political egalitarianism, it could 
also promote a stifling homogeneity that tended to suppress individual 
differences.23 Equally troublesome, this ersatz universality tended to mask the 
persistence of asymmetrical power relations within the sentimental fantasy. It is 
thus to the hierarchical structure of sentimentalism that I now turn. 
Reason, Distinction, and Exploitation 
In the sentimental tradition, sympathy is generated not by merely viewing 
the distress of another, but by actively entering into that other's circumstances.24 
This entry is facilitated by a narrative account of the principal's affliction. 
According to Smith, the "first question which we ask is, What has befallen you?" 
and "[t]ill this be answered... our fellow-feeling is not very considerable" (11-
12). Sympathy, then, is contingent on discourse; we enter into vicarious suffering 
only by entering into language and storytelling. Indeed, writes Smith, "[g]eneral 
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lamentations, which express nothing but the anguish of the sufferer, create rather 
a curiosity to inquire into his situation, along with some disposition to sympathize 
with him, than any actual sympathy that is very sensible" (11). Only when the 
interlocutor gains a full sense of the principal's grievances, Smith continues, 
can fellow-feeling be aroused. Thus, in Uncle Tom s Cabin, Eliza's entry into 
the home of Senator and Mary Bird does not incite immediate sympathy so 
much as curiosity and confusion. It is only after she relates her tale of horror 
that the audience gathered around her exhibit various signs of affective distress 
(150). Similarly, when the Senator brings the battered figure of Eliza to the 
home of Honest old John Van Trompe, the latter is concerned but emotionally 
unmoved. Only after the Senator relates "a few words" (160) of Eliza's story in 
private is honest John transformed, "com[ing]... nigh to swearin'" and "wipfing] 
his eyes with the back of a great, freckled, yellow hand" (160). Eliza's story 
thus acts as the catalyst for sympathetic response, circulating among characters 
and readers and producing intense emotion even in the absence of her actual, 
physical body. Feeling is disseminated in this scenario not merely though vision, 
witnessing the spectacle of suffering, but through discourse, relaying the narrative 
circumstances of suffering.25 
This emphasis on discourse suggests that the achievement of fellow-feeling 
relies on cognition and understanding rather than on any automatic or blind 
responsiveness. Smith affirms this when he writes that "[t]he compassion of the 
spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he himself would 
feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation, and, what perhaps is 
impossible, was at the same time able to regard it with his present reason and 
judgment" (12, emphasis added). "Reason and judgment," then, are necessary 
for the achievement of sympathetic unity, and yet, as Smith explains, it is precisely 
these elements that also limit the extent of this compassionate communion. 
Because the sympathetic onlooker approaches the scene of suffering in a rational 
state, his vicarious suffering is never simply a true "reflection" of the anguish of 
the principal. There is, writes Smith, a "secret consciousness that the change of 
situations, from which the sympathetic situation arises, is but imaginary," and 
this consciousness "not only lowers [the feeling in] degree, but, in some measure, 
varies it in kind, and gives it a quite different modification." While the sentiments 
of principal and spectator can achieve a "concord," then, they can never achieve 
any true "union" (22). "Reason and judgment" prevent the total collapse of 
boundaries between self and other. In psychoanalytic terms, they foster 
"differentiation," preserving difference even at the moment of emotional 
attunement.26 
This cognitive differentiation between participants creates a sense of distance 
and gives the scene of suffering a theatrical dimension. As David Marshall has 
commented, because sympathy is often accompanied by spectatorship and takes 
place at a rational level of remove, it operates on our senses much as a play 
might: "Sympathy in this sense is always already an aesthetic experience."27 
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The medium of fiction, of course, serves to separate the sympathizing reader 
even further from the lives of sufferers, thereby contributing to this aestheticizing 
effect. Ironically, then, although it is stories that produce the desired sympathetic 
response, it is also stories that increasingly remove witnesses from actual scenes 
of affliction. The result, as senti mental ism's detractors like to point out, is often 
passive spectatorship. Instead of actively struggling against human suffering, in 
other words, sentimental readers respond only on a mediated, psychic level. At 
worst, they indulge in the guilty pleasure of schadenfreude and at best they 
merely (to quote Harriet Beecher Stowe's famous injunction) "feel right."28 
This morally ambiguous aspect of sympathy can be glimpsed in "Aunt Judy's 
Story," a short narrative by Matilda G. Thompson published in Lydia Maria 
Child's Anti-Slavery Book (1859). Curling up on her father's lap, the young 
heroine of the story, Cornelia, pleads, "Dear papa, tell us a story with a poor 
slave in it, won't you? and I will give you as many kisses as you please." "No, 
no, papa," counters Cornelia's brother, Alfred, "not about the slave, but the 
poor Indian, who has been far worse treated than the slave was or ever will be." 
Brutal stories of each are told in an effort to establish who "was the worst used."29 
When Alfred and Cornelia finally agree that the slave was the more pitiful, the 
two "go to bed and thence to the land of dreams."30 Thompson's story 
demonstrates how the necessary distance between sufferer and sympathizer 
mitigates the urgency of social reform and turns sentimental tales of suffering 
into bedtime fare. Children, moreover, were not the only ones to appropriate 
stories of misused slaves and Indians for their leisure hours. Thomas Gossett 
reports that Uncle Tom s Cabin inspired a host of household products, including 
candles, clothes, and figurines. In one parlor game based on the novel, players 
competed with one another to see who could reunite the most slave families.31 
These accounts indicate the extent to which the suffering of dispossessed 
populations could be deployed towards middle-class entertainment and fantasy. 
This, then, is the danger of sentimental fiction: its scenes of affliction could be 
mobilized towards individual pleasure, thus reinforcing hierarchy under the guise 
of establishing community.32 
This sadistic potential of sentimental literature proceeds from a fundamental 
contradiction in the notion of sympathy. Although it is predicated on shared 
feeling, sympathy can arise only in response to an initial disparity. It is, in other 
words, the relative dispossession of the one that creates the conditions of 
possibility for the emotional attunement of the two.33 The paradox of sentimental 
fiction, then, is that it emphasizes the themes of community and benevolence 
only in the context of hierarchy and suffering; while it focuses on inherent equality 
and correspondence of feeling, it imagines these as consequences of fundamental 
asymmetries in the social order. Sentimental ism by this logic, is never simply 
Utopian expression because its fantasy of affective unity relies on the underlying 
presence of dispossession. Accordingly, affliction and hierarchy are the very 
mainstays of a healthy society for it is these alone that insure the creation of 
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fellow-feeling. This conception of American society was perhaps first articulated 
by John Winthrop in his sermon, "A Modell of Christian Charity," delivered in 
1630 while on board the Arbella headed from England to Massachusetts Bay. 
"God Almightie in his most holy and wise providence hath soe disposed of the 
Condicion of mankinde, as in all times some must be rich some poore, some 
highe and eminent in power and dignitie; others meane and in subjection." Among 
the reasons for the necessity of this inequality, Winthrop lists "[t]hat every man 
might have need of other, and from hence they might be all knitt more nearly 
together in the Bond of brotherly affection." For Winthrop, then, social hierarchy 
was a divinely ordained method for insuring Christian love and charity.34 
Two hundred years later, Catharine Maria Sedgwick drew on Winthrop's 
recipe for social unity in a novel she titled The Poor Rich Man and the Rich 
Poor Man. Beginning with the claim that "those that are well . . . can never 
value [things] as those who are . . . suffering,"35 Sedgwick's novel is a curious 
celebration of the joys of poverty and hard labor. "There is a lively pleasure in 
this making do that the rich know not of," Sedgwick writes (30). The affluent, 
on the other hand, know a different kind of pleasure; their existence is made 
meaningful through the kindness they confer on the less fortunate. Like Winthrop, 
then, Sedgwick imagines the needy poor and the generous middle class as 
constituting a perfect circuit of lack and surplus, of requirement and munificence. 
This mutuality is invoked as a way to obscure the more pernicious effects of 
class difference. As the novel's heroine, Susan, comments "when [your neighbors] 
are kind, it don't seem to me to make much difference whether you are rich or 
poor." Here is how Sedgwick's narrator responds to this statement: 
Susan's simple remark had an important bearing on that great 
subject of inequality of condition, which puzzles the 
philosopher, and sometimes disturbs the Christian. But did 
not our happy little friend suggest a solution to the riddle? 
Has not Providence made this inequality the necessary result 
of the human condition, and is not the true agrarian principle 
to be found in the voluntary exercise of those virtues that 
produce an interchange of benevolent offices? If there were a 
perfect community of goods, where would be the opportunity 
for the exercise of the virtues of justice and mercy, humility, 
fidelity, and gratitude? (39, emphasis added) 
Inequity, according to Sedgwick's narrator, is crucial to society for it provides 
the conditions of possibility for benevolent interaction. Without hierarchy, she 
implies—reiterating the terms of what 1 have called the sentimental paradox— 
there would be no occasion for the creation of community. 
Sedgwick reinforces this notion by emphasizing the ways social disparity 
gives rise to intense emotional attunement. Her novel centers on the members 
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of a hard working family, the Aikins, who, while not rich themselves, tirelessly 
minister to the deeply afflicted poor. Indeed, the novel verges on self-satire 
when the Aikin residence becomes the refuge for not only a sickly orphan and a 
starving elderly gentleman but also a poor young girl with an "idiot sister," a 
mother suffering from "over-exertion," and a father disabled through a fall from 
a building (83). The hero of the novel, Harry Aikin, makes clear that the primary 
motivation for charitable behavior towards these dispossessed figures is not 
social amelioration—after all, comments the narrator, "[w]e are all . . . to live 
here a few years-some in one station, and some in another" (112); rather, charity 
should be given for the purpose of emotional attachment. "[A]s mother used to 
tell me," comments Harry, "if you want to love people.. .just do them a kindness, 
think how you can set about to make them happier, and the love, or something 
that will answer the purpose, will be pretty sure to come" (11). Sedgwick thus 
celebrates social asymmetries in lived condition, because it is these which make 
possible intense emotional correspondence. 
Sympathy and its Vicissitudes 
In the hands of writers like Catharine Maria Sedgwick sentimentalism can 
appear as merely a tool of middle-class domination. Its nods to love and emotional 
attunement serve only to rationalize class hierarchy and to glorify economic 
deprivation. Indeed, so perverse was Sedgwick's celebration of poverty and 
suffering that it prompted Melville's scathing parody, "Poor Man's Pudding and 
Rich Man's Crumbs." But it would be inaccurate to say that sentimentalism 
only functions to legitimate social inequities or that sympathetic exchanges 
always reinforce patterns of sovereignty and submission. Although sentimental 
transactions are located at hierarchies, these hierarchies need not be static or 
reified, and in the hands of more nuanced writers they can often result in 
significant reversals and displacements. While Sedgwick's focus is limited to 
the actions and feelings of charitable sympathizers (she very rarely emphasizes 
the agency of suffering principals), other writers showcase the reactions of both 
members of the sympathetic exchange and in so doing create scenes involving 
less coherent or predictable patterns of domination. 
To understand the theoretical underpinnings behind this latter strategy, I 
return to Adam Smith's Theoiy of Moral Sentiments. As mentioned earlier, in 
Smith's model, the spectator of suffering imagines himself in the place of the 
afflicted party and in so doing achieves a "correspondence" or harmony of feeling. 
importantly, however, it is not only the spectator who must work to achieve this 
harmony but also the sufferer. This sufferer, writes Smith "passionately desires" 
the sympathetic fellow-feeling of the spectators that surround him; but "he can 
only hope to obtain this by lowering his passion to that pitch, in which the 
spectators are capable of going along with him. He must flatten . . . the sharpness 
of its natural tone, in order to reduce it to harmony and concord with the emotions 
of those who are about him" (22). Significantly, this regulatory action on the 
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part of the suffering principal is achieved through an imagined place-switching 
with the sympathizing spectator. As Smith writes, only by entering into the 
situation of the witness can the sufferer conceive "some degree of that coolness 
about his own fortune, with which . . . [others] will view it." For Smith, then, 
sympathy involves a mutual projection into the experience of the other. While 
the spectator is "constantly considering what [he himself] would feel, if [he] 
actually were the sufferer, so [is the sufferer] constantly led to imagine in what 
manner he would be affected if he was only one of the spectators of his own 
situation" (22). 
Smith's focus on the agency of both afflicted principal and sympathizing 
witness is significant because it points to a conception of psychic interaction 
that is fundamentally reciprocal in nature. His emphasis, in other words, is not 
on active subject and passive object but on mutually asserting subjects. It involves 
two fully realized individuals who occupy asymmetrical power positions but 
who nonetheless contribute equally to the affective exchange. His description 
seems to anticipate what Jessica Benjamin designates as the realm of 
intersubjectivity—"that zone of experience or theory in which the other is not 
merely the object of the ego's need/drive or cognition/perception but has a 
separate and equivalent center of self "36 According to Benjamin, because subjects 
meet as active independent agents, at once desirous of emotional attunement 
with others and protective of their own sovereignty, both contribute to an affective 
exchange that is open-ended and unpredictable, marked by a delicate balance 
between self-assertion and the need for "recognition." By conceding a similar 
mutuality in sentimental fiction, we as readers can focus on the contribution of 
suffering principals (often the poor, children, slaves, ethnic minorities, etc.), as 
well as on sympathizing spectators, thus complicating our assumptions about 
power and victimization. I close then with two sets of readings—the first from 
Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, the second from E.D.E.N. 
South worth's The Hidden Hand—which highlight the agency of both members 
of the sympathetic transaction, producing in the process less predictable, 
ideologically coherent messages. 
As James Baldwin was one of the first to point out, Stowe's novel, hinging 
on the "phenomenally forbearing" figure of Tom, may be read as a paean to the 
fantasy of black submission: "since he is black, born without the light, it is only 
through humility, the incessant mortification of the flesh, that he can enter into 
communion with God or man."37 But reading Tom's character only in terms of 
utter degradation overlooks the subtle fluctuations of power that attend his 
relations with his various oppressors. Augustine St. Clare, for example, is 
described as a man of "exceeding delicacy of constitution" (239), and his 
interactions with Tom reveal shifting patterns of power and intimacy. One instance 
of these follows a night of drunken revelry by St. Clare, which culminates in 
Tom "assist[ing] to get him composed for the night" (307). In the morning, their 
conversation runs as follows: 
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"Why, Tom, what's the case? You look as solemn as a 
coffin." 
"I feel very bad, Mas'r. I allays have thought that Mas'r 
would be good to everybody." 
"Well, Tom, haven't I been? Come, now, what do you 
want? There's something you haven't got, I suppose, and this 
is the preface." 
"Mas'r allays been good to me. 1 haven't nothing to 
complain of on that head. But there is OUQ that Mas'r isn't 
good to." 
"Why, Tom, what's got into you? Speak out; what do you 
mean?" 
"Last night, between one and two, I thought so. 1 studied 
upon the matter then. Mas'r isn't good to himself." 
Tom said this with his back to his master, and his hand on 
the door-knob. St. Clare felt his face flush crimson, but he 
laughed. 
"O, that's all, is it?" he said, gayly. 
"All!" said Tom, turning suddenly round and falling on 
his knees. "O my dear young Mas'r; I'm 4fraid it will be loss 
of all—all—body and soul . . . " 
Tom's voice choked, and the tears ran down his cheeks. 
"You poor, silly fool!" said St. Clare, with tears in his 
own eyes. "Get up, Tom. I'm not worth crying over." 
But Tom wouldn't rise, and looked imploring. (307-308) 
In its fascinating turns of emotional response, this passage highlights the 
instability that can attend relations of domination between two highly sensitive 
men. What does it mean for a slave to help his master undress following a night 
of intoxication and then to shame him with this fact the morning after? What do 
we make of a rebuke from a slave (one couched in extreme moderation and 
uttered "with his back to his master") can still elicit the feminized response of a 
crimson flush? How do we inteipret the slave who falls to his knees begging not 
for his own deliverance but for the salvation of his master, and the master who, 
weepingly and unsuccessfully, implores the slave to stand back up? Surely, these 
dynamics allow us to recognize a shifting rather than static conception of power, 
one that complicates—though of course never effaces—the ascendancy of owner 
over owned.38 In this scene, despite Tom's social inferiority and his legal status 
as slave, he succeeds in positioning St. Clare as the true sufferer, or, more 
accurately, as a tyrant whose abuse of power has been directed inward ("Mas'r 
isn't good to himself). During the course of their encounter, then, emotional 
attunement is achieved (both men cry) but in the atypical context of afflicted 
master and sympathizing bondsman. What are revealed in the process are 
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vicissitudes of feeling—shifting displays of righteousness, abasement, love, 
rebuke and shame. 
Unpredictable patterns of intersubjective intimacy can also be glimpsed in 
scenes of sympathy involving Little Eva. Eva's primary affective connections 
are with the slaves of her father's plantation, men and women who provide her 
with stories of loss and separation. Eva's eagerness to sympathize with these 
suffering unfortunates is derided by her mother as a "peculiar" tendency "to put 
herself on an equality with every creature that comes near her" (265). In contrast 
to Marie St. Clare who insists that servants and their masters must "know their 
place" (265), Eva engages in continual place-switching, imagining herself 
entering the feelings and circumstances of others. No doubt, Eva derives a certain 
amount of pleasure from this operation. When asked if she prefers "to live as 
they do at [her] uncle's, up in [free-soil] Vermont, or to have a houseful of 
servants" as they do in New Orleans, Eva responds "O, of course, our way is 
pleasantest. . . . Why, it makes so many more round you to love" (282). In this 
way, Eva confirms what I have called the sentimental paradox; that is, she 
embraces social inequity as the necessary agent for emotional attunement. 
And yet, Eva's sympathetic practices have another consequence, one which 
complicates the dynamic of domination implicit in her fantasy of "love." A deeply 
sensitive girl, she is transformed by stories of slave suffering. "These things 
sink into my heart" (326). She says of the tragedies she hears; "they [go] down 
deep" (403). Although she claims that she "ought to know such things" as slaves' 
misfortunes (403) and that "[i]t ain't so much for me to hear it, as [it is for them] 
to suffer it" (327), in fact these stories and the intense fellow feeling that follows 
prove as fatal to Eva as the actual events are to her slaves. She sickens and dies 
as a result of such stories indicating that for her sympathy has the power to 
eradicate absolutely the border between self and other.39 This peifect "union" in 
which there is no differentiation between subjects constitutes the threat of 
sympathy for Stowe, and I would argue that she showcases Eva's death in part 
as a cautionary lesson on the dangers of feeling too much, or of over-
identification. In so doing, however, Stowe also implicitly comments on the 
agency of slaves in the sympathetic transaction. 
Consider, for example, Eva's exchanges with the slave girl Topsy. Nearly 
the same age, the two are described in the language of radical alterity. They are 
"representatives of the two extremes of society" Eva is the "Saxon, born of 
ages of cultivation, command, education, physical and moral eminence;" Topsy 
is the "Afric, born of ages of oppression, submission, ignorance, toil and vice" 
(361-62). During their first encounter, however, Eva speaks "the first word of 
kindness [Topsy] had ever heard in her life" and this produces in Topsy "a 
sparkle of something like a tear" (362). With this Stowe obliterates the radical 
difference between the girls and replaces it instead with a recognition of shared 
humanity. As readers have noticed, this exchange is problematic, because Eva 
does not just feel for Topsy here, she enters and transforms her. "[I]n that 
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moment," Stowe writes following an especially intense interaction, "a ray of 
real belief, a ray of heavenly love, had penetrated the darkness of [Topsy's] 
heathen soul! She laid her head down between her knees, and wept and sobbed 
. . .
 cO, dear Miss Eva,. . . I will try [to be good]"'(410, emphasis added). In the 
pages that follow, Topsy becomes a veritable replica of Little Eva, arranging 
flowers, showing deep feeling, and eventually committing herself to missionary 
work in Africa. Eva's fellow-feeling, then, does not just result in Eva becoming 
(in Adam Smith's words) "in some measure the same" as the sufferer but also— 
in an ironic reversal—in her colonizing the sufferer, making her over in the 
image of herself. 
But if such interactions result in Topsy's domestic appropriation, they also 
and just as importantly bring about Eva's death.40 Indeed, it is following their 
initial interaction that we first learn of Eva's illness and observe her increasingly 
deteriorating condition. If Eva exerts a kind of imperial agency in these scenes, 
not just entering Topsy but transforming her, then Topsy is no less active. For in 
becoming like Eva, Topsy might be described as usurping Eva's place. (Indeed, 
in the aftermath of Eva's death, Topsy becomes the substitute for Miss Ophelia's 
affections.) In receiving Eva's sympathy, Topsy in turn enters Eva and in effect 
supplants her, thereby achieving what Frantz Fanon has described as the native's 
"dream of possession."41 What start out looking like benevolent scenes of fellow-
feeling, then, end in images of violent displacement. Topsy may learn from Eva 
"how to feel" and thus assimilate to the sentimental order, but not without first 
killing off this order's quintessential representative.42 
The reversals that attend Eva and Topsy's interactions might be understood 
as the consequences of genuinely reciprocal psychic relations. Eva enters Topsy 
and takes on her suffering even as she colonizes her; Topsy enters Eva and takes 
on her sentimental domesticity, even as she helps to kill her off. In this way, 
both subjects succeed (following Benjamin's formulation) in "transforming and 
being transformed by the other," albeit in less than productive ways. These 
shifting fantasies of omnipotence and affliction make Uncle Tom s Cabin a 
difficult work to classify ideologically. Its imperialist fantasy and domesticating 
impulse, in other words, seem to be in dialogue with contrary albeit equally 
violent proclivities. This violence does not exclude from Stowe's novel the 
presence of compassionate communion. Indeed, as I have been arguing, taking 
over the other begins with the sympathetic entry into her experience. In Stowe's 
imagination, however, the consequences of this entry are varied and 
unpredictable, culminating in shifting dynamics of domination and love. These 
vicissitudes may reflect Stowe's desire to represent the volatility of antebellum 
social relations or they may be an effect of her own "contradictory 
consciousness."43 As Joan Hedrick has pointed out, Stowe was deeply invested 
in "the slave s humanity," but her portraits were also "inflected by a sense of 
'otherness'. . . [resulting from a] hierarchical perception of a social inferior."44 
In either case, the fluid indeterminacy of the Eva-Topsy bond was a way for 
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Stowe to register conflicting conceptions of master-slave interaction. Moreover, 
as we shall see, it became a useful template for other authors invested in relations 
between social unequals. 
Unlike Stowe, E.D.E.N. Southworth was little interested in the subjugation 
of slaves. Of the over fifty novels she wrote between 1849 and the end of her 
life (1899), only two were explicitly abolitionist and in those her focus was 
primarily on the heroism and suffering of whites under slavery.45 Southworth 
was by no means blind to social injustice, but her true passion and allegiance 
lay with dispossessed white women—"the hopeless, helpless experience of 
feminine destitution in a male-dominated society."46 This commitment to women 
grew out of South worth's own experiences of abuse and neglect, first as a child 
"left to play in a freezing garret and driven away from the fire in the parlor" and 
later as a deserted wife and mother of two.47 Having turned to writing when she 
could no longer support her children through teaching in the Washington public 
school system,48 Southworth often used her fiction to comment on women's 
economic and social confinement in America. At the same time, however, 
Southworth's vision often fell well short of feminist critique. Unlike Fanny Fern, 
who ended her own novel of women's economic exploitation with the 
protagonist's acquisition of a bank note,49 Southworth tended to complete her 
fictions about women with marital rather than financial security. While she 
championed the right of the destitute woman to work, she did not embrace 
economic autonomy as an ideal, and for the most part, her novels are populated 
less by independent female thinkers than by models of classic domestic 
femininity. 
Southworth's most famous and eclectic novel—The Hidden Hand ( 1859)— 
speaks to her conflicted understanding of women's place in America. Enormously 
influential in its own day, The Hidden Hand was serialized in The New York 
Ledger three times before the turn of the century and inspired cross-Atlantic 
fashion statements (including hats, suits, and boots) as well as numerous stage 
performances.50 Its beloved heroine, Capitola Black, is an unusual figure of 
American girlhood because she flouts authority and is said to "abhor sentiment."51 
Indeed, as a swarthy, adventurous girl with a penchant for cross-dressing, Capitola 
might be said to critique ideologies of womanhood that were circulating in 
America in the first part of the nineteenth century.52 And yet, Southworth's novel 
is better described as expanding or reconfiguring the culture of antebellum 
feminine domesticity rather than rejecting it completely. Consider, for example, 
Capitola's exchange with a neighborhood pastor, who having heard of Cap's 
wayward behavior and motherless state, determines to offer the girl some 
Christian counsel. During the course of their conversation, Capitola, amid 
displays of violent affliction and guilt, confesses to having a young stranger 
hidden in her closet. Here is how their exchange concludes: 
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A groan that seemed to have rent his heart in twain burst 
from the minister, as he repeated in deepest horror: ". . . 
Wretched girl! better you'd never been born than ever so to 
have received a man!" 
"Man? man? MAN?—I'd like to know what you mean 
by that . . ." exclaimed Capitola, lifting her eyes flashing 
through their tears. . . . "//—/ give private interviews to a 
man! Take care what you say . . . !" 
"Then if you are not talking of a man, who or what in the 
world are you talking about?" exclaimed the amazed minister. 
"Why, Alfred, the Blenheim poodle that strayed away 
from some of the neighbor's houses, and that I found in the 
woods and brought home and hid in my closet, for fear he 
would be inquired after . . . I knew it was wrong, but then he 
was so pretty—" 
Before Capitola had finished her speech, [the minister] 
had seized his hat, and rushed out of the house in indignation 
. . . (185). 
Far from fully upending social protocol, this scene works to reinforce the 
theme of womanly chastity even as it mocks it. Capitola remains virtuous 
throughout the novel and her outrage at suggestions to the contrary ("7/—/give 
private interviews to a man!") are themselves examples of scrupulous female 
conduct. In this way, Southworth at once satirizes the conventions of nineteenth-
century womanhood without subordinating their ideological force. Her novel 
cannot be dismissed as parody because despite moments of levity and an 
unusually independent protagonist, its equally salient attention to suffering and 
morality, along with its inclusion of three female characters who are models of 
"true womanhood," lodges it within the sentimental, domestic tradition. Still, as 
the scene above demonstrates, The Hidden Handparticipates in this tradition in 
rich and interesting ways. Here, Southworth invokes all the elements that readers 
have come to expect from sentimentalism—the contrite and suffering heroine, 
the stern, admonishing minister, the promise of confession, sympathy, and 
redemption—only to subvert these in an irreverent display of female craft and 
wit. Capitola "plays" the part of the afflicted heroine to the minister's patriarchal 
authority, but the usual structure of power is reversed when Cap exposes the 
prank and the minister pronounces himself "sold by" her deception (185). In 
her unusual portrait of trickster girl and bamboozled minister, then, Southworth 
upends normative social roles and reverses hierarchical dynamics, thereby 
evidencing the fluid indeterminacy of affective relational bonds. 
The exchange between Capitola and the minister reveals the two sides of 
Southworth's heroine: "Capitola," the aristocrat, is chaste and well-bred; "Cap" 
(as she is often called), the street-wise girl, is irreverent and resourceful. 
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Importantly, it is in this latter characterization that South worth links her heroine 
to African American culture. Indeed, although she is white, everything about 
Cap Black—her name, her dark features, her sexual desirability, hertricksterism 
and verbal word play, and, of course, that she was mistakenly sold into slavery 
as an infant—would seem to suggest her affinity with antebellum conceptions 
of blackness. Thus, while Southworth is unconcerned with the fate of real blacks 
in The Hidden Hand (the plantation slaves in the novel are dismissed as 
"blockheads" [125], "wretches" [159], and "good-for-nothing . . . loungers" 
[190]), she uses racialized tropes in depicting her heroine. Such a strategy has a 
paradoxical effect: it allows Southworth to comment on the theme of white 
women's domestic bondage, even as it frees Cap from the constraints of feminine 
ideology, giving her a measure of freedom and movement not usually afforded 
white women. Blackness, in other words, liberates Cap from the restrictions of 
"true womanhood."53 As we shall see, this results in a certain amount of 
transgression and surprise in Cap's relations with those around her. 
The novel begins with the young heroine being discovered on the streets of 
New York by her wealthy guardian and returned to Virginia. There, she encounters 
a "gilded slavery" (187)—a term that articulates the intersections of racial and 
gender subjugation—-intended to tame her wild, intractable nature. Cap resists 
this domestication through cunning stratagem. In fact, this "minx of a girl . . . 
[with] eyes quick and vivacious as those of a monkey" and a special gift for 
verbal punning seems a version of the Signifying Monkey—the trickster figure 
who deploys comic antics in an effort to destabilize authority.54 More precisely, 
Cap, I would suggest, is a rewriting of the century's most famous image of 
recalcitrant black girlhood—the figure of Topsy. The similarities between the 
two are highly suggestive: both girls are taken into families to be domesticated, 
and both delight in their "diablerie" (a word that appears in reference to each). 
Their names (Top and Cap) are not only phonetically similar, but mean the 
same thing: to excel, outdo, or surpass. Given that each responds to her own 
subjugation with plots of masterful revenge, their names speak to the African 
American tradition of besting or what Henry Louis Gates has called "Signifyin(g) 
as capping."55 
The correlations between Stowe's fictional creation and Southworth's 
become ever more striking in the context of scenes in The Hidden Hand between 
Cap and Clara Day. As her name indicates, Clara (Clear) Day is Southworth's 
quintessential, sentimental heroine, a mild, deeply feeling girl, whose blue eyes, 
golden brown hair, and gentle manner all recall Stowe's paradigmatic figure of 
sentimental girlhood, Eva St. Clare. Although Clara generally resides over her 
own plot-line in The Hidden Hand, Southworth brings her in direct contact with 
Cap for a few key exchanges, that uncannily recall the meetings of Eva and 
Topsy. In the first. Cap visits the recently-orphaned Clara in a gothic castle 
where she (Clara) has been taken captive by the novel's villain. Much like Eva's 
pacifying effect on Topsy, Clara's "melancholy beauty so deeply impresses] 
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Capitola that almost for the first time in her life she hesitatefs], from a feeling of 
diffidence" (281). Clara's words of kindness issue from "the sweetest voice 
Capitola had ever heard" (281) and produce, as in the Eva-Topsy dynamic, a 
profound sympathetic communion: 
As they spoke, the eyes of the two young girls met. They were 
both good physiognomists and intuitive judges of character. 
Consequently, in the full meeting of their eyes, they read, 
understood and appreciated each other. The pure, grave and 
gentle expression of Clara's countenance, touched the heart 
of Capitola. The bright, frank, honest face of Cap 
recommended her to Clara. The very opposite traits of their 
equally truthful characters attracted them to each other. (282) 
Although both Cap and Clara are wealthy and white, their exchange, like 
that of Topsy and Eva, is figured in the language of radical alterity. It is only in 
the mutual gaze that each gains access to the personhood of the other and the 
two are reduced to their essential, affective humanity. As if to prolong the intensity 
of this exchange, South worth creates a nearly identical one three chapters later. 
Having returned to the castle to renew their acquaintance. Cap finds Clara in a 
state of quiet despair. "Tell me, dear Clara, what is the matter?" begs Capitola. 
"[H]ow can I help you? What shall T do for you?" 
Before trusting herself to reply, Clara gazed wistfully into 
Capitola's eyes, as though she would have read her soul. Cap 
did not blench, nor for an instant avert her own honest, gray 
orbs; she let Clara gaze straight down through those clear 
windows of the soul into the very soul itself. . . (304) 
In both these scenes, gazing upon the other is figured as a kind of psychic 
transport. Clara looks into the eyes of her visitor and in the process achieves a 
kind of entry into her soul. Her gaze, moreover, is returned in full by Capitola, 
indicating the important mutuality of their exchange. As in the Eva-Topsy 
dynamic, this psychic place-switching results in a behavioral transformation 
into the other. Following their meeting, Clara "contracts] some of [her] eccentric 
little friend Capitola's ways" (326), exhibiting a pluck and bravado heretofore 
unseen. Cap, for her part, takes on Clara's characteristic "true womanhood," 
"contenting] herself for the first time in the narrative "with quiet mornings of 
needlework" (329). As in the Eva-Topsy dynamic, then, the mutual influence of 
each member in the sympathetic exchange means that subjects are capable of 
(to quote Benjamin again) "transforming and being transformed by the other." 
In revisiting Stowe's dynamic of radical alterity, South worth thus adopts 
and converts it, so that sympathy retains its imperial effects but with far less 
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pernicious results. Indeed, while in Uncle Toms Cabin the price of emotional 
attunement is the co-opting of one subject (Topsy) and the death of the other 
(Eva), in The Hidden Hand, sympathy has more positive consequences.56 This 
is demonstrated in the girls' final exchange, where sympathetic feeling gives 
way to concerted action. As the two face each other, Clara tells her tale of suffering 
to Capitola, who responds by suggesting that each girl put on the habiliments of 
the other and attempt to trade places. In the scene that follows, Clara escapes 
the clutches of her tormentors by affecting the posture and attitude of her friend, 
while Cap, now dressed in Clara's mourning robes, performs a burlesque of 
white domestic womanhood that succeeds in fooling Clara's captors. What starts 
out, then, as a scene of psychic place-switching culminates in a literal place-
switching. This results not only in the continued influence of each girl on the 
other but also in the subordination of patriarchal authority. For in transforming 
into the other, each girl hoodwinks her male guardian (Gabriel Le Noir in the 
case of Clara, Captain Hurricane in the case of Cap) and in the process gains a 
measure of personal freedom. Clara and Cap's psychological and physical place-
switching, then, is not so much a private struggle for domination over the other 
as it is an allied attempt at female transcendence. 
In this way, the Clara-Cap dynamic involves a reciprocity that is not simply 
reducible to Eva and Topsy's power struggle (or what Jessica Benjamin would 
call their "complementarity.")57 Indeed, sympathy in The Hidden Hand leads 
not to shifting omnipotence but to mutual assistance: because each girl has come 
to feel for the other, each can provisionally adopt the other's personhood; she 
can perform a convincing rendition of the other that helps to destabilize masculine 
domination. Significantly, neither girl is erased or subsumed in the process. On 
the contrary, the ability of each to parody the behavior of the other indicates the 
presence of a persistent self that strategically performs a role rather than 
unconsciously assumes it. In Southworth's vision, the subject exceeds the effects 
of the sympathetic transaction; Cap and Clara feel for and transform into each 
other, while still retaining access to a resilient, inviolable self. Of course, this 
radical understanding of sympathetic exchange—where fellow-feeling is a 
provisional strategy leading to women's allied subversion of patriarchy—is not 
sustained in Southworth's text. The novel ends with Cap and Clara's double 
wedding and the renunciation of Cap's transgressive blackness (through her 
new surname, Grey son). Nonetheless, Southworth's depiction of the Cap-Clara 
dynamic points to the potential liberatory effects of sympathy. In their meeting, 
not only do subjects mutually transform one another, but these transformations 
form the basis of alliance and social change. 
My readings of Uncle Tom s Cabin and The Hidden Hand are meant to 
demonstrate the flexibility of the sympathetic meeting, its ability to register 
different kinds of interactions even within the limits of a single text. Like many 
middle-class authors of their time, Stowe and Southworth wrote novels that 
were ideologically inconsistent. While they attempted to manage exchanges 
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between privileged and dispossessed subjects, their stories also include surprising 
eruptions of affect and vicissitudes of feeling, that reflect both the authors' own 
ideological contradictions and their attempts to portray realistic models of 
interaction. Recognizing the variety and variability of affective attachments 
allows us to relinquish static political readings of sentimental fiction and to 
engage instead in what Eve Sedgwick has called "a fresh, deroutinized sense of 
accountability to the real."58 Such a stance would recognize that sympathy was 
employed not as a tool of unilateral domination or unambivalent love, but rather 
as a means of depicting the transformations that attend interpersonal experience. 
When subjects converge, the result is shifting, reciprocal dynamics, culminating 
in alternating patterns of aggression, intimacy, and even alliance. By focusing 
on the particularized, nuanced, and idiosyncratic manifestations of intersubjective 
dynamics, we as readers begin to grasp the many ways that antebellum social 
relations were imagined and symbolized. 
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